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Abstract
The paper presents a theory of nominal asset prices for competi-
tively owned oil. Focusing on monetary e¤ects, with exible oil prices
the US dollar oil price should follow the aggregate US price level. But
with rigid nominal oil prices, the nominal oil price jumps proportion-
ally to nominal interest rate increases. We nd evidence for structural
breaks in the nominal oil price that are used to illustrate the theory of
oil price jumps. The evidence also indicates strong Granger causality
of the oil price by US ination as is consistent with the theory.
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature has studied the e¤ects of exogenous oil price shocks
on macroeconomic outcomes, such as ination, interest rates, and output
(Hamilton (1983), Bernanke et. al. (2004), Kim and Loungani (1992), Leduc
and Sill (2004)). Much less has been said, however, about the factors that
determine the international oil price itself.1 While it is not impossible in
principle that the real oil price is driven predominantly by oil sector-specic
(e.g. technological) factors, largely unrelated to the broader macroeconomy,
it seems much more plausible that the world oil price should be a¤ected by
global macroeconomic conditions as well. The latter appears even more likely
when considering the nominal US dollar price of oil.
In this paper we focus on changes in the nominal oil price that must
occur in equilibrium just to o¤set persistent shifts in US ination. We view
such ination shifts as rooted in persistent changes in the growth rate of the
money supply. The oil price changes take place in a competitive setting in
which it is costly to renegotiate oil contracts. The latter gives rise to a pricing
condition for the nominally rigid oil price whereby the newly set nominal oil
price builds in the expected future ination.
The model is in the minimalist setting that can illustrate the theory. It
is a representative agent, deterministic, cash-in-advance economy that incor-
porates oil as an input to the production process of the nal consumption
good. In Section 2 we present evidence of nominally rigid oil prices prior to
the mid 1980s. When the nominal oil price is stable within ination regimes
as during this period, our model implies that, from one ination regime to
the next, the oil price must jump in line with the change in the nominal
interest rate net of output growth. This adjustment is necessary to restore
equilibrium so that the oil rms owners earn a competitive return on their
xed factor of production, the oil eld (Section 3).
The driving force in our setup are infrequent persistent changes in the rate
of ination rooted in exogenous money supply changes. We test for and date
1A few recent exceptions include Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004), Kilian (2009), and
Nakov and Pescatori (forthcoming).
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such breaks in ination regimes using a test for multiple structural breaks
due to Bai and Perron (1998) (Section 4). We nd evidence for four such
breaks in the postwar period: two upward shifts in 1967 and 1973, and two
downward shifts in 1982 and 1992 (see the top panel of gure 2); we identify
three related breaks in the nominal oil price: two upward jumps in 1973,
1979, and a crash in 1985. Using the estimated break dates, we compute the
oil price changes implied by the model and contrast them with the actual
oil price changes, showing that the theory is consistent with the data for the
period of rigid oil prices. In addition, we revisit Hamiltons (1983) Granger
causality tests. At rst we replicate Hamiltons result that ination did not
Granger-cause the oil price prior to 1973. However, we nd robust evidence
that the oil price is Granger caused by US ination since 1973. Qualications
and possible extensions are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, and an extension
considering nominal gold prices is made in a similar fashion in Appendix A.
2 Stylized Facts of Nominal Oil Price Change
Figure 1 graphs the annual percentage change in the nominal oil price versus
the annual percentage change in the rate of ination (the annual acceleration
of the price level) for the period from 1957 to 2009. Ination is dened in
the usual way as the annual percentage change in the consumer price index
(with the energy component removed). The gure shows that nominal oil
prices were relatively unchanging before 1985, except for big spikes around
1974 and 1979, while the ination rate moved around throughout the period.
The spikes represent movements to new oil price levels that for a while re-
main relatively unchanged. With the oil price stable up to the rst spike,
between the rst two spikes, and between the second spike and around 1985,
these periods may characterize di¤erent regimesof oil price levels. Starting
around 1985, oil price changes begin following ination rate changes rather
closely.
Alternatively, looking directly at the monthly series for the US dollarWest
Texas Intermediate oil price (in the middle panel of Figure 2) it is clear that,
at least up until 1979, the nominal oil price was changed rather infrequently.
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A closer look at the data reveals that the average price spell for the period
from 1957 to 1979 was more than a year (and close to a year-and-a-half if we
exclude the couple of occasions with two or three consecutive price changes
of a few cents); the longest price spell is around 2 years; other nominal oil
price series, such as the series compiled by the IMF, show even more rigid
behavior.
The above pattern has to do with the fact that prior to the 1979 Iranian
revolution, much of the oil market was dominated by long-term contracts
with oil companies (Biolsi, 1995). In particular, Hamilton (1983) documents
the practice of postedoil prices during the pre-OPECperiod, and the
regulatory defense of posted prices by the Texas Railroad Commission and
other US state regulatory agencies. The commissions tended to keep the
nominal price of oil constant, allowing the quantity produced to uctuate to
meet demand, unless a large disturbance occurred. This policy of keeping
the dollar price of oil xed between major realignments was maintained in
the OPEC era (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996; Samii, 1987).
At the same time, the oil industry was conscious of the erosion of the real
price of oil through ination and was anxious to make up for this loss at any
opportunity (Hamilton (1983)). According to LaFeber (1993) the Arab-
Israeli conict triggered a crisis already in the making... The West could not
continue to increase its energy use 5% annually, pay low oil prices, yet sell
ination-priced goods to the petroleum producers in the Third World.2
Thus, the prevalence of long term contracts and the actions of oil commis-
sions, combined with the continuous erosion of oil prots through ination,
set the stage for the infrequent and large oil price adjustments seen in the
data during this period. In the following section we lay our a simple model
meant to account for the size of oil price changes, given the attendant changes
in the rate of ination.
2In an interview for the New York Times in 1973 the Shah of Iran, the worlds second-
largest exporter of oil at the time, said: Of course [the price of oil] is going to rise, .
Certainly! ... You [western nations] increased the price of wheat you sell us by 300%, and
the same for sugar and cement... You buy our crude oil and sell it back to us, redened as
petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price youve paid to us... Its only fair that, from
now on, you should pay more for oil; (LaFeber (1993); p.292).
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3 The Model
The model is a standard deterministic perfect foresight representative agent
economy, with oil used as an intermediate input in the production of nal
goods. The representative agent produces the nal good and consumes it.
There is a representative rm, the oil producer, which rents capital and labor
from the consumer. The oil rm owns a xed input, the oil eld, which is
assumed to grow at the exogenous growth rate of output. The xed input
gives long term competitive rents to the oil rm. The consumer in turn owns
the oil rm and gets these rents back as income.
3.1 Representative Agent Problem
The agent as a consumer maximizes the preference-discounted stream of pe-
riod utility subject to an income and an exchange constraint. Let the utility
function be denoted by u () with the aggregate consumption good at time t,
denoted by ct, and leisure time, denoted by xt, entering as arguments,
ut = u (ct; xt) : (1)
The output of goods production, denoted by yt, is divided between consump-
tion and investment. Human capital ht augments the raw labor time in the
production of goods and oil, and is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate gt;
ht+1 = ht (1 + gt+1) :
The agent as producer of goods has a production function that uses ef-
fective labor, ltht; capital denoted by kt, and oil as an intermediate input,
denoted by iOt. Capital is used in two ways, as an input in goods production,
and also as rented to the oil rm for use in oil production.
The share of capital used for goods production, st; and oil production,
sOt, add to one,
st + sOt = 1: (2)
The shares of time also add to one. With lOt being the time spent working
for the oil rm, the time constraint is,
1 = xt + lt + lOt: (3)
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The goods production function is assumed to have constant returns to
scale in the three inputs, with the following form,
yt = f (stkt; iOt; ltht) : (4)
With investment in capital denoted by it and the depreciation rate by , the
capital accumulation equation is given by,
it = kt+1   kt (1  ) (5)
The consumer works for the goods producer and the oil rm, o¤ering
labor for wages wt(lt + lOt)ht and capital for rents rtkt.
The agent faces a constraint that consumption goods are bought with
cash, giving rise to the standard Clower (1967) condition. With the nomi-
nal price of the aggregate consumption good denoted by Pt, this exchange
constraint is,
Mt = Ptct: (6)
Let zOt denote the number of shares in the oil rm held at time t; VOt
the price of a share, DOt the per-share dividend, and Rt the net nominal
interest rate. Let the nominal price of oil be denoted by POt: The agents
nominal income constraint sets the nominal value of goods output Ptf , plus
the nominal income from labor PtwtlOtht and capital PtrtsOtkt employed in oil
production, plus the total dividends of the oil rm DOtzOt, and plus the cash
transfer Ht, to outlays on consumption Ptct, investment in capital Ptit; and
in oil POtiOt, in money Mt+1 Mt, and in bond holdings Bt+1  (1 +Rt)Bt,
and investment in oil rm stocks VOt (zOt+1   zOt) : Substituting in the capital
and time allocation constraints in equations (2) and (3), the nominal income
constraint becomes,
Ptf [(1  sOt) kt; iOt; (1  xt   lOt)ht] + PtwtlOtht + PtrtsOtkt +DOtzOt +Ht
= Ptct + Pt [kt+1   kt (1  )] +Mt+1  Mt +Bt+1   (1 +Rt)Bt+
+VOt (zOt+1   zOt) + POtiOt: (7)
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3.2 Government
The nominal money stock, denoted by Mt, is exogenously supplied through
lump sum transfers to the consumer. With Ht denoting the lump sum trans-
fer, the supply equation is
Mt+1 =Mt +Ht: (8)
We further denote the money supply growth rate by t where Ht = tMt:We
assume that t is constant, except for infrequent exogenous shifts marking
breaks in ination regime, which we test for and date in section 4.
3.3 Oil Firm
Oil is produced with a CRS function using labor lOtht, capital sOtkt; and an
exogenous endowment input, Ft, denoting oil elds,
iOt = (lOtht)
1 (sOtkt)
2 F 1 1 2t : (9)
The oil elds are assumed to grow over time at the exogenous growth rate gt;
so that Ft+1 = Ft(1 + gt+1). The competitive oil rm earns a positive prot
because of the scarcity of this xed input. The oil output iOt is sold to the
goods producer for the nominal value of POtiOt: The current period nominal
prot of the oil rm is paid out as the dividend DOt to the shareholders,
DOt = POt (lOtht)
1 (sOtkt)
2 F 1 1 2t   PtwtlOtht   PtrtsOtkt: (10)
The oil rm maximizes the present discounted stream of prots at time t,
equal to the current dividend DOt plus the share price VOt: The share price
in turn equals the stream of expected future dividends, discounted by the
nominal rate of interest,
VOt =
1X
s=t+1
"
DOsQs
j=t+1 (1 +Rj)
#
: (11)
The oil rm thus maximizes,
Max
fsOt;lOtg1t=0
1X
s=t
"
DOsQs
j=t (1 +Rj)
#
; (12)
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subject to (10), where the summation starts from period t.
The rst-order conditions for this maximization are that, for all t, the
marginal products equal the factor prices,
1

POt
Pt

iOt
lOtht

= wt; (13)
2

POt
Pt

iOt
sOtkt

= rt: (14)
Substituting from equations (13) and (14) for the factor prices, into the
dividend equation (10), yields
DOt = POtiOt; (15)
where   1 1 2 is the income share of the oil eld. Then, the maximized
present discounted value of current and future prots is given by,
DOt + VOt =
1X
s=t
"
POsiOsQs
j=t (1 +Rj)
#
: (16)
3.4 Equilibrium
The consumer maximizes utility subject to constraints, taking the prices of
goods, factors of production (including oil), bonds, as well as the money
transfer, as given. The oil rm similarly takes goods, factor, bond, and oil
prices as given. The consumer maximizes the present discounted sum of
utility (1), with respect to ct, xt, sOt, lOt, kt+1, iOt, Mt+1, Bt+1, and zOt+1,
given that  2 (0; 1), and subject to constraints (6) and (7). Dening the
relative price of oil as pOt  POt=Pt, and the ination rate as t = Pt+1=Pt 1;
the rst-order conditions can be written as:
u1 (ct; xt)
u2 (ct; xt)
=
1 +Rt
wtht
; (17)
1 + gt =  (1 + rt   ) ; (18)
f1 (stkt; iOt; ltht) = rt; (19)
f2 (stkt; iOt; ltht) = pOt; (20)
f3 (stkt; iOt; ltht) = wt; (21)
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(VOt+1 +DOt+1) =VOt = 1 +Rt+1; (22)
1 +Rt = (1 + rt   ) (1 + t) ; (23)
1 +Rt = (1 + t) =: (24)
Going by each condition respectively, in (17) the marginal rate of substitution
between goods and leisure equals the ratio of the shadow goods cost, including
Rt as the exchange cost, to the e¤ective real wage. Assuming u1 (ct; xt) = 1=ct
for consistency with balanced growth, by (18) the exogenous growth rate of
output equals the marginal product of capital net of depreciation multiplied
by the time discount factor. From (19), (20), and (21), the capital, oil,
and labor factor prices are equal to the inputsmarginal products in goods
production. Equation (22) in turn gives the nominal asset pricing condition
for the oil rms share price, with the nominal return on investing in the
oil rm equal to the nominal rate of interest. Condition (23) is the Fisher
equation for the nominal interest rate as the sum of the real interest rate and
ination. And nally, equation (24) shows the dependence of the nominal
interest rate on the exogenous growth rate of the money supply.
Note that writing the asset pricing equation (22) in real terms by dividing
by the price of goods Pt; and using the Fisher equation (23), the real return
to investing in the oil rm is equal to the real rate of return on capital,
VOt+1=Pt+1 +DOt+1=Pt+1
VOt=Pt
= 1 + rt+1   : (25)
3.4.1 Competitive Equilibrium Balanced Growth Path
The denition of the balanced growth path equilibrium for the consumer
requires that ct, kt, it, iOt, Mt=Pt, VOt=Pt, and DOt=Pt all grow at the same
constant growth rate g, while leisure xt and the capital and labor shares st,
sOt, lt, and lOt, are stable; shares in the oil rm zt are unity in equilibrium,
as the consumer owns 100% of the oil rm.
Proposition 1 Along the balanced-growth path, the real value of the oil
rms stock is equal to the present discounted stream of the real returns to
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the xed factor (the oil eld),
DOt + VOt
Pt
= pOtiOt

1 + rt   
rt   gt

, and
VOt
Pt
= pOtiOt

1 + gt   
rt   gt

:
Proof. The present discounted value of equation (16) can be written in
real terms by dividing by the nominal goods price,
DOt + VOt
Pt
= 

POt
Pt

iOt +

 POt+1
Pt+1
 
Pt+1
Pt

iOt+1
1 +Rt+1
+
+

 POt+2
Pt+2
 
Pt+2
Pt+1
 
Pt+1
Pt

iOt+2
(1 +Rt+1) (1 +Rt+2)
+ : : :
Using the Fisher equation of interest rates (23), this reduces to
DOt + Vt
Pt
= 

POt
Pt

iOt +

 POt+1
Pt+1

iOt+1
1 + rt+1    +

 POt+2
Pt+2

iOt+2
(1 + rt+1   ) (1 + rt+2   ) + : : :
(26)
Along the balanced growth path, human and physical capital stocks ht and kt,
and oil iOt, grow at the same constant rate g, while sOt and lOt are constant.
Thus, the input ratios iOt
lOtht
and iOt
sOtkt
are constant; since the real factor prices
rt and wt are also constant (from equations (19) and (21)), the real oil price
pOt  POt=Pt in equations (13) and (14) must also be constant. So the
nominal oil price POt must move one-to-one with the aggregate price level
for any given money supply growth rate. Since rt is constant, this implies
that along the balanced growth path equation (26) reduces to the following
function of real variables only,
DOt + VOt
Pt
= pOtiOt +
pOtiOt (1 + gt)
1 + rt    +
pOtiOt (1 + gt)
2
(1 + rt   )2
+ : : :
= pOtiOt

1 + rt   
rt      gt

: (27)
In turn,
VOt
Pt
=
DOt + VOt
Pt
  DOt
Pt
= pOtiOt

1 + gt
rt      gt

: (28)
where on the right hand side of the rst equality we have used (15) expressed
in real terms.
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3.4.2 Rigid Oil Price Contracts with Growing Oil Supply
Abstracting from the vast contracting literature, and guided by the intuition
of Gray (1978), it is assumed that oil supply contracts are costly to change.
We assume that all contracts determine the quantity and the nominal oil
price, as agreed upon between the consumer buying the oil for use in produc-
tion and the oil rm producing and selling the oil. In particular, the nominal
price POt is xed for all future time, and the supply of oil is xed at iOt with
a set growth rate of gt: As an additional clause of the contract, it is assumed
that the nominally xed oil price can change only if the exogenous money
supply growth rate has changed in a persistent fashion; then, the oil price
is reset to a new level consistent with the new competitive balanced growth
path conditions.3
Suppose the oil contract has just been renegotiated. With the xed nom-
inal oil price at time t denoted by POt; the current value of the oil rms
optimal prot stream, from equation (11), is now given by
VOt =
1X
s=t+1
"
POsiOsQs
j=t+1 (1 +Rj)
#
: (29)
Proposition 2 With xed nominal oil price contracts, the nominal asset
pricing condition implies that, for a small cost of recontracting, the required
percentage change of the nominal oil price is approximately equal to the per-
centage change of the nominal interest rate net of the growth rate,
POt+1
POt
'

Rt+1   gt+1
Rt   gt

:
Proof. Writing out the terms in (29) and using the balanced growth
path conditions (including the fact that, within any given ination regime,
3In a more standard (s; S)-type model of infrequent oil price changes, the timing of oil
price changes would be an endogenous variable as well, with oil price changes occuring
whenever the gain from adjusting exceeds a given xed cost of adjustment. We abstract
from the complications arising from such a dynamic stochastic setup, focusing instead only
on the intensive margin of adjustment in steady state, that is, on the size of the oil price
changes necessary to restore balanced growth path, competitive, equilibrium.
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the nominal interest rate remains constant), the above expression becomes,
VOt =
POtiOt+1
1 +Rt+1
+
POtiOt+2
(1 +Rt+1) (1 +Rt+2)
+ ::: (30)
=
POtiOt (1 + gt)
1 +Rt
+
POtiOt (1 + gt)
2
(1 +Rt)
2 + :::
= POtiOt

1 + gt
Rt   gt

:
Adding the current period nominal dividend, POtiOt, yields
DOt + VOt = POtiOt

1 +Rt
Rt   gt

: (31)
Forwarding equation (31) by one period and substituting the resulting equa-
tion together with (30) into the no-arbitrage condition (22), we obtain
VOt+1 +DOt+1
VOt
=
POt+1iOt+1

1+Rt+1
Rt+1 gt+1

POtiOt

1+gt
Rt gt
 = 1 +Rt+1: (32)
It follows that, along the balanced growth path with iOt+1 = (1 + g)iOt, and
assuming a small recontracting cost,
POt+1
POt
' Rt+1   gt+1
Rt   gt : (33)
The Proposition shows that the nominal asset pricing equation for the oil
rms stock is respected if the price of oil jumps in proportion to the increase
in the nominal interest rate net of the growth rate. A similar condition is
derived for the price of gold in Appendix A.
Although this relationship between oil prices and the nominal interest
rate must hold eventually for changes from one balanced growth path to
the next, we grant that is says nothing about the specic path of transition
from one steady-state to the next, or account for any possible delays in the
transmission from ination to the oil price. Yet, the formula is suggestive
of what would happen eventually should there be an exogenous change in
the growth rate of the money supply. Imagine that money supply growth
12
increases at time t+1; from t to t+1, and that it is expected to stay at that
level for all time into the future. By equation (24), Rt+1 increases relative to
Rt: Then, equation (33) gives the new equilibrium oil price POt+1 consistent
with the oil rm earning a competitive return on its xed input, and the
economy operating along the new equilibrium balanced growth path.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that in either case rigid oil price contracts
or ination-indexed contracts  the oil price will react to ination shocks.
Combining equations (24), (23), and (18), ination in turn is directly a¤ected
by the exogenous money supply changes, 1 + t = (1 + gt)(1 + t):
In the following section we compute the oil price changes implied by
equation (33) and compare them to the actual oil price realignments from
one regime to another found in the data. In addition, we revisit Hamiltons
Granger-causality evidence regarding the non-causality of the oil price by US
ination.
4 Ination Breaks and Oil Price Changes: a
Numerical Illustration
In this section we o¤er a simple illustration of the ability of our model to
explain oil price changes as rooted in ination regime shifts. We rst test
for and date changes in ination regimes using a popular statistical test
for multiple structural breaks due to Bai and Perron (1998). Using the
same technique we then identify subsequent shifts in the nominal oil price.
Given the oil price break dates, we apply the oil pricing formula derived
from our theoretical model to the data, comparing actual with predicted
oil price changes. We show that our simple model is capable of explaining
a substantial fraction of the observed oil price shifts. Finally, we revisit
the Granger-causality evidence reported by Hamilton (1983), checking the
robustness of his results with respect to the data period and to the presence
of structural breaks.
The data sample includes 632 monthly observations from January 1957
to August 2009 of the US consumer price index (for all items less energy),
the 10-year Treasury bill rate, the dollar prices of oil and gold, and quarterly
13
data on the real US GDP. All variables except the price of gold are taken
from the St. Louis Feds FRED II database; the gold price is available from
the International Financial Statistics compiled by the IMF. The latter is
included as part of an extension of the theory to gold prices as outlined in
Appendix A. Table 1 denes the variables used.
4.1 Testing for and dating structural breaks
We identify ination regime changes with breaks in the intercept of the ina-
tion equation of a bivariate VAR including the log di¤erence of CPI and the
nominal price of oil. We apply the Bai and Perron (1998) sequential test for
structural breaks, allowing for up to ve breaks in the intercept. Formally,
the test is based on the following regression equation,
 log(Pt) = 0 +
mX
i=1
iDi;t +
kX
i=1
i log(Pt i) +
kX
i=1
iPO;t i;
where Di;t = 1(t > Ti) are dummy variables with Ti denoting the timing of
the ith break, and m is the maximum allowed number of breaks (ve in our
case).
The Bai and Perron (1998) test rst searches for a single break, the timing
of which is determined endogenously; once a break is found, the sample is
split at the estimated break date and each subsample is tested again for a
break; this process continues until the test fails to nd any additional breaks,
or until the maximum allowed number of breaks is reached. Table 3 reports
the estimated break dates, the statistical signicance level at which they are
found, as well as a 90% condence interval for each break.
We nd four breaks in the ination equation: two upward shifts in 1967
and 1973, and two downward shifts in 1982 and 1992. These breaks can
be seen on gure 2, which shows that average ination more than doubled
from 1.8% per year during 1957-67 to 4.5% during 1967-73, and then almost
doubled again to 8.3% during 1973-82. In contrast, moving to 1982-92 the
mean of ination was halved to 4.1%, and then it was almost halved again
to 2.4% from 1992 on.
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Our theory cannot account for the recent run-up and collapse of oil prices
since Y2K as rooted in ination changes. Hence, when analyzing the oil price,
we work with a subsample from January 1957 to December 1999. For this
subsample, and using the same procedure as before, we identify three breaks
in the mean oil price: two upward shifts in 1974 and 1979, and a crash in
1985. These are clearly seen in gure 1, and the statistical procedure dates
them even more precisely than the ination breaks.
The rst jump in the price of oil is clearly preceded by the rst upward
shift in ination in 1967. Moreover, the 90% condence interval for the sec-
ond upward shift in ination in 1973 precedes the condence interval for the
1974 oil price jump, implying that the second persistent increase in ination,
too, started before the rst oil price shock. Likewise, the oil price crash
of 1985 was preceded by the sharp disination initiated in 1982. Precedence
does not prove causality, but these episodes are at least consistent with the
hypothesis that changes in the ination regime may be responsible for per-
manent shifts in the nominal oil price as suggested by our model.
Although we werent able to identify statistically specic break dates for
the gold price, comparing panels 2 and 3 of gure 2, concurrent movements in
the gold price show a striking similarity to those of the oil price. Therefore,
we include the gold price in the model computation below to show that it
also appears to be reecting ination changes; however, the lack of discrete
level breaks suggests that gold had a much more exible price throughout the
period. Indeed, the two dramatic increases in the period 1970-1975 and 1978-
1980, and the subsequent decrease from 1981 to 1985, were more gradual,
although of similar proportion to the abrupt shifts in the oil price.
4.2 Oil price changes implied by the model
To illustrate simply the implications of the model of rigid oil prices, here we
use the estimated structural breaks to compare the models implied changes
in the price of oil (and gold) to the actual changes. Since the breaks for the
oil price are the most clearly demarcated, they will be used to dene the
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regime periods.4
We thus consider that the change in the rigid oil price in itself is the
characterization of the structural break, as in the middle panel of Figure 2;
this gives four regimes: from 1.1957 to 12.1973, 1.1974 to 4.1979, 5.1979 to
11.1985, and 12.1985 to 12.1999. Table 3 presents the average long term
US nominal interest rate (%), the average GDP growth rate (%), and the
changes, from one regime to the next, in the average prices of oil and gold
observed in the data.
Using the formula in equation (33), applied to the above regime intervals
for oil prices, we obtain the nal column of table 3. Compare this with the
actual price changes in columns 4 and 6. For the rst oil price change, from
Regime 1 to 2, the computation is 4.35, while the actual oil price change is
4.08. For the next two changes, from 2 to 3 and from 3 to 4, the computation
is somewhat below the actual oil price changes (1.9 versus 2.5, and 0.4 versus
0.6). For the last regime change, from 4 to 5, the model predicts an oil price
decline, while the actual oil price increased substantially.
As discussed in Section 2, in the rst two subperiods up to 1979 most oil
trade was carried out by long-term contracts, making the nominal oil price
relatively stable. This can explain the ability of the model to be close to
the actual oil price changes in the rst two rows of Table 2. The ability of
the model to also be close to the change in the oil price in the third row,
of 0.6 compared to the models 0.4, suggests the interpretation, from the
point of view of the model, that the oil price drop in 1985 was also largely
(dis)ination-related.
As a summary measure, consider, for the rst three regime changes, mul-
tiplying together the actual oil price changes:
PO2
PO1
PO3
PO2
PO4
PO3
= (4:08)(2:49)(0:60) = 6:07;
a 607% increase. In comparison, the models computation gives
(4:35)(1:87)(0:42) = 3:44;
4Finding common structural changes across a system of multivariate equations is still
in its early stages of development; see Qu and Perron (2007) for an advance on this.
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a 344% increase. So it could be interpreted that the model accounts for
344=607; or 57%; of the total oil price change.
The oil price change occurring in moving to the last regime, from 1999 to
2009, however, is much larger than the model computation predicts, suggest-
ing that this later price change was not just ination adjustment, but also
a substantial increase in the relative price of oil. This is consistent with the
view of real commodity price increases due to growing demand from Asian
economies, such as China.5
Gold price changes are roughly similar in proportion to the oil price shifts,
and so the models computations compare almost as well for gold prices too.
4.3 Granger causality evidence
Finally, we perform Granger (1969)-causality tests to determine whether past
ination can improve signicantly on the prediction of the price of oil based
on its own lagged values alone. We base the tests on bivariate VARs (with
twelve and with twenty four lags) including the log di¤erenced nominal price
of oil and rst log di¤erenced CPI. We test the robustness of the results with
respect to the sample period, and to controlling for the breaks identied in
the previous section. In addition, we test for reverse causality: from the price
of oil to ination. Table 4 reports the results.
In a rst step we replicate Hamiltons (1983) nding, namely the lack of
statistically signicant evidence that ination Granger caused the nominal
price of oil prior to 1973. In particular, Hamilton failed to reject the hypoth-
esis of no Granger causality from ination to the nominal price of oil, at
10% statistical signicance for his VAR with 4 quarterly lags, and at 16% for
his VAR with 8 quarterly lags. Even though we use a di¤erent denition of
ination (Hamilton used the implicit price deator for business income), a
slightly di¤erent oil price series, and work with monthly rather than quarterly
data, our result for the period up to 1973 is essentially the same: we do not
nd evidence of Granger causality from ination to the price of oil at 13%
5June 1997 marks the date that Hong Kong was turned back over to China from the
UK with this possibly marking the opening up of the Chinese economy.
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signicance for our VAR with twelve lags (k=12), and at 25% signicance
for our VAR (k=24) (see the rst two rows of Table 4).
We then apply the same test on the more recent sample from 1973:1
to 2009:8. In rows 3 and 4 we report strong evidence that over this later
period US ination Granger-caused the nominal price of oil. Specically, we
reject Granger non-causality at 1% both in the VAR(12) and the VAR(24)
specications. This is in contrast with Hamiltons failure to nd a macro
series that Granger-causes oil prices prior to 1973.
We test the robustness of this nding to the presence of the three breaks
in the oil price series since 1973. Rows 5 and 6 of Table 4 show that, while
the inclusion of level shift dummies slightly reduces the residual predictive
power of ination for oil price changes, the tests still show strong evidence
of Granger causality from ination to the price of oil, at 1% signicance for
the VAR(12), and at 2% signicance for the VAR(24). The results were very
similar if we cut o¤ the sample in 1999:9 instead.
For completeness, we repeat the Granger causality tests for the entire
period from 1957:1 to 2009:8, with 12 and 24 lags, with and without breaks.
The results, reported in rows 7 to 10 of Table 4 are very similar to those
for the second sample. Namely, we nd very strong evidence (at 1% or 2%
signicance) that US CPI ination Granger-causes changes in the nominal
price of oil, as predicted by the theory.
On the other hand, evidence that over the same period uctuations in
the price of oil Granger-caused US ination is weaker. In particular, we nd
no evidence (80% signicance) of causality from the oil price to ination in
the rst period up to 1973, and somewhat stronger, but still relatively weak
evidence (10-15% signicance) for the second part of the sample, and for the
entire period (12% signicance) when structural breaks are ignored. Interest-
ingly, when allowing for structural breaks, the evidence for causality from the
oil price to ination becomes stronger (at 6% for the VAR(12)), suggesting
that oil price shocks might explain some of the cyclical ination uctua-
tions around regime-wise means (rather than the, arguably more important,
changes in ination regime).
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5 Discussion
The assumptions of the model, in terms of stationary balanced growth path
conditions holding on into the future after any given money supply growth
rate change, are a type of comparative statics exercise. We are aware that
applying this exercise to a dynamic explanation of oil prices, with each regime
exhibiting the stationary conditions, is counterfactual. Yet, we nd it sur-
prising that such a simple computation of oil price changes is not wildly far
o¤ from the actual changes. This illustrates some power of the theory, even
if it provides no way of determining empirically that the theory is valid, or
that the predicted oil prices changes fall within some acceptable condence
bounds. Therefore, the results should be viewed as a tentative illustration of
the nominal phenomenon that could be behind nominal oil price movements,
abstracting from any other dynamic supply and demand factors, for the case
in which the nominal oil price is rigid within ination regimes.
Thus, the computations in the previous section support the notion of
ination catch-up and anticipation by the oil price right up until the last
regime change. A contradiction of the theory is found for the last switch
from regime 4 to 5, when the models computation is of a di¤erent order
of magnitude as the actual oil price change. This suggests that in this last
period, after the opening up of world markets to include much broader Asian
demand for commodities, an important part of the oil price change may have
been related to real as opposed to nominal factors.
6 Conclusion
The deterministic analysis, with the comparative statics of a change in the
money supply growth rate leading to a new regime of xed oil prices, is
an approximation to a more fully specied dynamic economy with uncer-
tainty. Price distortions from rigid oil prices are not analyzed, and growth
is assumed to be exogenous. Further steps could include making growth en-
dogenous and determining how the distortion of rigid prices a¤ects allocation
margins. Adding in uncertain money supply shocks, and goods productiv-
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ity shocks, would allow for identication of the models properties over the
business cycle, which could be compared to volatility data on oil prices. A
variance decomposition of oil prices could show the relative contributions of
the di¤erent shocks to the oil price volatility.
Extension of the model to include endogenous growth could look at e¤ects
of oil price changes on the balanced-path growth rate (Gillman and Kejak
2005) and over the business cycle (Benk, Gillman, and Kejak 2008). This
might be a useful way to consider how oil price changes a¤ect output and its
growth rate (Rebelo 2005).
Related applications of such a monetary theory of nominal asset prices
could include other nominal prices that tend to remain rigid. One prominent
candidate could be the xed implicit rental price built into the price of a
house. Using this natural rigidity of pre-built-in rental rates might allow the
theory to explain the shooting up of house prices during the 1970s, and their
subsequent fall in the early 1980s, that was tandem to the concurrent historic
rise and fall of ination.
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Appendix A: Extension with Gold
Consider an extension of the model to include gold, and the nominal price of
gold. Gold is modeled with the assumption that it serves a reserve function
for the at money stock; without such a reserve it is assumed that people
would be unwilling to hold the at money. Similar to the oil production,
there is a xed input, being the gold mine FGt, which yields a competitive
prot to the gold rm owner.
It is assumed that the consumer, acting as owner of the central bank, is
required to hold a fraction, denoted by  2 (0; 1) ; of the nominal money
stock in terms of nominal gold capital; in return the consumer receives the
transferHt. This adds a second type of exchange constraint to the consumers
problem. With the gold capital denoted by kGt; and with the nominal price
of the gold capital denoted by PGt, this constraint is written as
Mt = PGtkGt: (34)
The consumer now divides goods output between consumption of goods,
investment in oil, investment in standard capital, and investment in gold
capital, denoted by iGt. With G denoting the depreciation rate, the gold
investment is given by
iGt = kGt+1   kGt (1  G) : (35)
In terms of the allocation of resources, the consumer now additionally
spends time working for the gold rm, denoted by lGt, so that the time
constraint is
1 = xt + lt + lGt + lOt: (36)
The consumer rents capital to the gold rm, with share denoted by sGt, so
that the shares add to one:
st + sOt + sGt = 1: (37)
The consumer invests in the equity stock of the gold producer and receives
dividends for this each period. With the value per share denoted by VGt; the
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dividends denoted by DGt; and the share of the stock ownership denoted by
zGt, the time t stock investment plus dividend is given by VGt (zGt+1   zGt)+
DGtzGt: The consumer rents out capital and labor to the gold producer, as
in the oil problem.
The gold producer has the technology
iGt = (lGtht)
1 (sGtkt)
2 F 1 1 2Gt ; (38)
with the dividend DGt given by
DGt = PGt (lGtht)
1 (sGtkt)
2 F 1 1 2Gt   PtwtlGtht   PtrtsGtkt: (39)
It is assumed that the rm which produces the gold investment, faces the
same xed factor (gold mines), competitive markets, and CRS production
technology conditions as the oil production rm. The gold rms problem is
to maximize the value DGt + VGt with respect to labor and capital inputs,
lGt and sGt,
Max
fsOt;lOtg1t=0
1X
s=t
"
PGs (lGshs)
1 (sGsks)
2 F 1 1 2Gs   PswslGshs   PssGsksQs
j=t (1 +Rj)
#
:
(40)
Given the CRS technology, prot maximization implies,
DGt + VGt =
1X
s=t
"
PsiGsQs
j=t (1 +Rj)
#
: (41)
The consumer budget constraint is now
Ptf ([1  sOt   sGt] kt; iOt; [1  xt   lOt   lGt]ht) + Ptwtht (lOt + sOt)
+Ptrtkt (sOt + sGt) +DOtzOt +DGtzGt +Ht =
= Ptct +Mt+1  Mt +Bt+1   (1 +Rt)Bt + Pt (kt+1   kt (1  )) + POtiOt
+PGt (kGt+1   kGt (1  G)) + VOt (zOt+1   zOt) + VGt (zGt+1   zGt) : (42)
and the consumer problem is to maximize utility in equation (1) with respect
to ct, xt, sOt, lOt, kt+1, iOt, Mt+1, Bt+1, zOt+1, plus the additional variables
zGt+1, kGt+1, sGt, and lGt, subject to equations (6), (34) and (42).
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Dening pGt = PGt=Pt; the rst-order conditions now add the equation,
pGt+1 [t+1=t+1 + 1  G]
pGt
= 1 + rt+1    (43)
which implies that, in equilibrium, the return to investment in gold capital
must equal the real return on investment in standard capital. The return to
investment in gold is the relative shadow value of the reserve constraint (34),
pGt+1t+1=t+1, plus the capital gain net of depreciation (1  G) pGt+1.
The additional asset price equation for the gold stock price is given by
(VGt+1 +DGt+1) =VGt = 1 +Rt+1: (44)
Given a exible price of gold, the price of gold will rise at the rate of
ination, as follows in parallel fashion from Proposition 1. Assuming in
contrast that the nominal price of gold is rigid at PGt, the implied gold price
change from one regime to the next is given by PGt+1
PGt
= Rt+1 gt+1
Rt gt , as follows
in parallel fashion from Proposition 2.
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Appendix B: Figures and tables
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Figure 1: Annual Price Acceleration and Oil Price Changes (%)
Note: Annual price acceleration is dened ast=t 1, where t = Pt=Pt 1; t refers
to a year and Pt refers to CPI less energy.
Example 1: a doubling of the rate of ination from 2% to 4% is a 100% acceleration of
the price level: (4-2)/2=100%. Example 2: a fall of ination from 3% to 1% is a 66.7%
acceleration of the price level: (1-3)/3=66.7%. In the period from 1957 to 2009 there was
only one year in which the annual ination rate was negative: 2009.
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Figure 2: Ination, oil price, gold price
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Table 1: Data Series
P US consumer prices, all items less energy (seas. adj.), 19821984=100
g 4log di¤erence of real GDP (billions of 2005 dollars, seas.adj.)
R Monthly yield on 10-year Treasury bills (%)
PO West Texas Intermediate oil price, $ per barrel
PG Price of gold, London, $ per ounce
Table 2: Estimated Break Dates
Break Dates Signicance 90% Conf. Interval
Ination
Apr. 1967 5% 8/+6 months
Feb. 1973 10% 13/+3 months
Jul. 1982 5% 8/+23 months
Apr. 1992 5% 16/+21 months
Oil price
Jan. 1974 2.5% 4/+0 months
May 1979 2.5% 2/+1 months
Dec. 1985 2.5% 6/+4 months
Note: Max. ve breaks allowed; the trimming parameter for the supF(l+1|l) test is 0.1.
Table 3: Nominal Interest Rates, GDP Growth Rates, Oil and Gold Prices
Regime 10-Year Growth Oil price Gold price Model
Rate Rate Aver. % Aver. % %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1.1957-74 4.98 3.85 3.15 41.00
2.1974-79 7.88 2.97 12.85 4.08 162.29 3.96 4.35
3.1979-85 11.87 2.71 31.94 2.49 416.78 2.57 1.87
4.1985-99 7.16 3.28 19.10 0.60 366.99 0.88 0.42
5.1999-09 4.49 1.66 50.31 2.63 503.29 1.37 0.73
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Table 4: Granger Causality Tests
Null hypothesis Period Breaks Lags k Obs. F -stat Prob.
 log(P )9  log(PO) 57:1-72:12 No 12 179 1.4847 0.1352
No 24 167 1.2003 0.2561
73:1-09:8 No 12 440 2.3916 0.0054
No 24 440 1.8782 0.0080
Yes 12 440 2.2793 0.0083
Yes 24 440 1.8122 0.0117
57:1-09:8 No 12 619 2.2752 0.0079
No 24 607 1.8816 0.0071
Yes 12 619 2.0855 0.0162
Yes 24 607 1.7906 0.0122
 log(PO)9  log(P ) 57:1-72:12 No 12 179 0.6469 0.7993
No 24 167 0.5989 0.9267
Yes 12 179 0.6744 0.7740
Yes 24 167 0.7357 0.8056
73:1-09:8 No 12 440 1.4062 0.1597
No 24 440 1.4369 0.0853
Yes 12 440 1.7336 0.0575
Yes 24 440 1.4614 0.0759
57:1-09:8 No 12 619 1.4759 0.1284
No 24 607 1.3516 0.1234
Yes 12 619 1.7583 0.0518
Yes 24 607 1.3596 0.1190
Note: The tests "with breaks" include indicator variables for the breaks reported in Table
2 in the periods in which they apply. These are the three breaks found for the oil price
in 1974, 1979 and 1985; and the four breaks found for ination in 1967, 1973, 1982, and
1992.
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